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I. INTRODUCTION
Anne, a surgical technician at a local hospital, recently learned that she was
HIV-positive. She works in the emergency room and, as a part of her job, she
hands surgical instruments to doctors performing emergency surgery. It is a fast
paced and unpredictable environment. Her hands often come in contact with sharp
instruments. Although Anne has never put her hands into a patient's body cavity,
there is a remote possibility that she may need to do so in the future. There is
always a possibility, however small, that she will cut herself and come into blood-
to-blood contact with a doctor or patient. The hospital learns from an anonymous
source that Anne is HIV-positive and tells her that she must accept a clerical posi-
tion or be fired. The administration claims that using sharp instruments and pa-
tient contact are integral components of her job and that the use of gloves will not
mitigate the danger because surgical instruments can pierce gloves and blood-to-
blood contact is theoretically possible. She refuses to leave her current position
and is fired. Is she entitled to relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act1
(ADA)?
The answer to this question may depend on where you live because, although
the ADA prohibits discrimination based on an individual's disability, there is an
exception to the prohibition against discrimination if the individual's disability
poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others. In Bragdon v. Abbott,2 the
Supreme Court held that HIV could be considered a disability under the ADA.3
However, the Court has not answered the question of what constitutes a direct
threat. Because the Supreme Court did not resolve the direct threat matter in
Bragdon, questions about the level of evidence necessary to establish a direct threat
exist. What constitutes a risk? What does the term "significant" mean? How does
one determine when a "significant risk" is present? When does reasonable accom-
modation eliminate the significant risk? Does the type of employment impact
whether or not a significant risk exists? If so, how can a direct threat be elimi-
nated?
Circuit courts have answered these questions differently and there is signifi-
cant disagreement regarding the level of evidence necessary to prove that an HIV-
positive individual poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others. On the
one hand, the First and Ninth Circuits interpret significant risk to mean more than
a mere theoretical possibility of transmission. 4 These courts require that a party
attempting to invoke the exception provide comprehensive and objective medical
evidence that there is a significant risk of transmission. However, the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits approach the burden of proof from a different
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
3. Id. at 655.
4. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840
F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1988).
MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2
HIV AND THE ADA: WHAT IS A DIRECT THREAT?
perspective and require significantly less medical evidence. 5 For these courts, a
showing of a theoretical possibility of transmission is enough to invoke the direct
threat exception, even if the odds of transmission are extremely small.
This Comment analyzes the protective legislation for individuals with dis-
abilities, the legislative history, the codification of the direct threat exception, and
Supreme Court precedents to show that Congress intended to enact a direct threat
exception that requires strong, objective medical evidence in an effort to protect
individuals with disabilities, including those who are HIV-positive, from unwar-
ranted prejudice.
In Section II, this Comment presents an overview of the two major pieces of
legislation enacted to protect individuals with disabilities from unfair prejudice,
the Rehabilitation Act of 19736 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.7 The
overview provides definitions of important terms, such as "disability" 8 and "rea-
sonable accommodation." 9 It examines the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of the ADA, which provides insight into the intended scope of the leg-
islation, the controversy regarding the inclusion of HIV under the definition of
disability, and the decision to require that a direct threat exception be invoked only
if a "significant risk," 10 not "any risk," is present. The discussion makes clear the
ambitious goals of Congress to eliminate unfair discrimination against individuals
with disabilities and provide a context for the current legal environment.
Section III provides a detailed discussion of the "direct threat exception."1 1
In addition to examining the definition of direct threat, this Comment takes a de-
tailed look at a leading direct threat case, School Board v. Arline. 12 This case is
important because, in enacting the ADA, Congress codified the direct threat stan-
dard 13 articulated in Arline and Arline continues to be cited as authority in direct
threat cases. 14 This early case is also helpful because it provides evidence that the
Supreme Court has traditionally required comprehensive and objective medical
evidence when a party attempts to invoke a direct threat exception. This section
will also explore the Supreme Court's landmark HIV decision, Bragdon v. Abbott. 15
This case marks the first time that the Supreme Court addressed whether HIV-
positive individuals are protected under the ADA. Although the Court in Bragdon
did not decide how much evidence is necessary to invoke the direct threat excep-
tion, this Comment analyzes the Court's examination of the medical evidence in
5. Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995); Bradley v. Univ.
of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922,924 (5th Cir. 1993); Estate of Mauro v. Borgess
Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398,407 (6th Cir. 1998); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir.
1999).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
8. Id. § 12102(2).
9. Id. § 12111(9).
10. Id. § 12111(1)(3).
11. Id.
12. 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
13. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359.
14. E.g., Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (1 th Cir. 1999); Estate of Mauro v. Borgess
Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 400-03 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d
1261, 1265-66 (4th Cir. 1995); Btadley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922,
924-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701,704-05 (9th Cir. 1988).
15. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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the case. 16 In its decision to remand, the Supreme Court's analysis provides subtle,
but important, directives to lower courts. 17 The intense scrutiny of the medical
evidence by the Supreme Court provides evidence that the Court, as well as Con-
gress, intended a direct threat standard requiring solid, objective medical evidence
rather than a theoretically possible or "any risk" standard.
Section IV of this Comment examines the controversy and different levels of
evidence required within the circuit courts. The First and Ninth Circuits are closely
aligned with the Supreme Court's implicit directives and the legislative intent be-
hind the ADA. 18 Four circuit courts, however, have failed to recognize the impor-
tance of the "significant risk" requirement established by Congress and the Su-
preme Court. Instead, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have taken a
more cautious approach to the direct threat exception as applied to HIV-positive
individuals, requiring less evidence and only small odds of transmission to invoke
the exception. 19
Section V of this Comment, the conclusion, synthesizes the information set
forth in the paper to provide a finding that, in order to fulfill the ambitious goals of
the ADA, the direct threat exception should be invoked only when the moving
party presents exacting, objective medical evidence.
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 197320 was the first major piece of federal legisla-
tion attempting to address discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Under
the Rehabilitation Act, the term "individual with a disability" means an individual"who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes
or results in a substantial impediment to employment; and (ii) can benefit in terms
of an employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation services provided" by
the legislation. 21 Under the statute, the term "major life activities" means "a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities; ... a record of such an impairment;" or "regarded as having such an
impairment."22
The statute deals with three major areas of federal involvement. First, the
statute enacts employment requirements of nondiscrimination and affirmative ac-
tion for federal employers. 23 Second, federal contractors are also required to imple-
16. Id. at 649-54. The Supreme Court acknowledged the congressional codification of the
Arline test and applied this standard in its direct threat discussion. id. at 649-51. The Supreme
Court also looked closely at the evidence presented by both parties in the case but remanded the
case because of the importance of having the most accurate, and current, medical evidence avail-
able. Id. at 649-54.
17. Id. at 653-54.
18. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 88-90 (1st Cir. 1998); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court,
840 F.2d at 703. The Ninth Circuit decided Chalk before the enactment of the ADA; however, it
continues to be relevant to the direct threat discussion because it employed the Arline test. Id.
19. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F3d at 1296-99; Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d
at 403-04; Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at 1266; Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D.
Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d at 924-25.
20. 29 U.S.C. 701-796 (2000).
21. Id. § 705(20)(A).
22. Id. § 705(20)(B).
23. Id. § 791(b).
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ment nondiscrimination and affirmative action in employment policies. 2 4 Finally,
entities receiving financial assistance from the federal government, such as educa-
tional institutions, transportation, places of public accommodation, and social ser-
vices, are required to implement nondiscrimination policies and provide for rea-
sonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities. 25
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued regulations in an
attempt to provide guidance to entities subject to the Rehabilitation Act.26 In this
regulation, the Department stated that "physical or mental impairment" included
the following:
(A) [A]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; car-
diovascular; reproductive, digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retar-
dation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learn-
ing disabilities. 27
The department also attempted to clarify the meaning of the term "major life ac-
tivities" by explaining that the term included "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing.... learning, and work-
ing." 28
Although the regulation helped to explain the meanings of "physical and men-
tal impairment" and "major life activities," the regulation did not explicitly present
a list of diseases and conditions covered by the Rehabilitation Act.29 In a later
explanation of the regulation, the Department listed examples of the diseases and
conditions, such as "orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral
policy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, dia-
betes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and ... drug addiction and alcohol-
ism," but also made clear that the list was not exhaustive. 30
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to eliminate discrimination against individuals
with disabilities. 3 1 The purpose of the ADA was to provide a "clear and compre-
hensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream
of American life .... -32 The enactment of the legislation provided enforceable
standards to address "discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to
ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing these stan-
dards on behalf of individuals with disabilities. '33
The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substan-
24. Id. § 793.
25. Id. § 794.
26. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2) (2002).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A.
30. Id. In addition to emphasizing that the list of physical or mental impairments were not
exclusive, the Department also declined to narrow the definition of handicapped person. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
32. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 22-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
33. Id.
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tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of
such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment."'34 In order
to be a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA, an individual with
a disability must satisfy the required "skill, experience, education and other job-
related requirements of the employment position" and the individual must be able
to complete the essential tasks of the job "with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion."'35 The ADA does not specify particular disabilities covered under the Act
due to the difficulty in constructing a comprehensive list of coverage. 36
Congress required that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) issue employment related regulations 37 in an effort to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the ADA. 38 In these regulations, the EEOC defined the terms located
in the first prong of the definition, "physical or mental impairment, ' 39 "major life
activities,"'4 0 and "substantially limits. '4 1 These definitions are particularly im-
portant because an HIV-positive person is protected under the ADA only if he or
she satisfies all three of these regulatory definitions.
Under the ADA, "physical or mental impairment" means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, muscu-
loskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardio-
vascular, reproductive, digestive, enitor-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2002). For purposes of the ADA, reasonable accommodation
means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified
applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant
desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or cir-
cumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that
enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of
that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a dis-
ability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its
other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
(2) Reasonable accommodation may include but is not limited to:
(i) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(ii) Job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant
position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate adjust-
ment or modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies; the provision
of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12211. The ADA does state that a person is not disabled, for purposes of the
ADA, solely because of homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or
other sexual behavior disorders; compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or psycho-
active substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1.
39. Id. § 1630.2(h).
40. Id. § 1630.2(i).
41. Id. § 1630.20).
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endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities. 4 2
According to the EEOC, "substantially limits" means that an individual, due
to his or her disability, cannot "perform a major life activity that the average per-
son in the general population can perform," or that the individual with a disability
is "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity" compared to the ability of
an "average" person's performance of a major life activity in the same "condition,
manner, or duration."'43 There are several factors to consider when evaluating
whether the impairment substantially impacts a major life activity, such as "nature
and severity of the impairment," the "duration, or expected duration, of the impair-
ment," and "[t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or
long term impact of or resulting from the impairment."44 Although the regulation
does not provide an exclusive list of "substantially limiting disabilities," it does
state that HIV is "inherently substantially limiting." 4 5
Finally, the EEOC defined the term "major life activities. ' 4 6 "Major life ac-
tivities" are "basic activities that the average person in the general population can
perform with little or no difficulty." 47 Although the EEOC is not exclusive,4 8 it
provides examples of "major life activities," including "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working." 49 The definition of "major life activity" is significant
because, as the Supreme Court discussed in Bragdon v. Abbott,50 although HIV-
positive individuals may have physical impairments, these individuals are not pro-
tected under the ADA unless the "impairment affects a major life activity." 51
The ADA provides protection for individuals with disabilities in four major
circumstances. 5 2 First, an individual with a disability is protected from discrimi-
nation in employment matters. 5 3 An employer5 4 may not discriminate against a
"qualified individual" with a disability "in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
42. Id. § 1630.2(h).
43. Id. § 1630.2(j).
44. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
45. Id. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j).
46. Id. § 1630.2(i).
47. Id. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(i).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 1630.2(i).
50. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
51. Id. at 637. In this case, the Respondent argued that HIV infection substantially limited
her reproduction ability and this constituted a "major life activity." Id. The Supreme Court
noted that given the invasive and fatal course of the disease, other HIV-positive individuals may
argue that the disease substantially limits other "major life activities" but limited their discus-
sion in this case to reproduction. Id. at 638.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
53. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
54. An employer, for the purposes of the Act, is an individual "engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks." Id. § 12111.
55. Id. § 12112.
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training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 55 However,
an employer may defend against a charge of discrimination if he or she can prove
that the individual cannot perform the job-related tasks even if "reasonable accom-
modations" are made or if the individual poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of others. 56
In the second component of the ADA, public entities 57 cannot deny qualified
individuals the opportunity to participate in, or receive the benefits of, public ser-
vices, programs, or activities. 58 The provisions regulating public entities in the
ADA include both facilities and vehicles of public entities. 59
Third, the ADA prohibits discrimination of "qualified individuals" in places
of public accommodation. 60 The definition of a place of public accommodation is
broad in order to ensure the Act encompassed all places open and available to the
public.6 1 Congress expanded the scope of federal protection to cover places of
public accommodation based upon a finding that an "overwhelming majority" of
individuals with disabilities did not frequent places of public accommodation be-
56. Id. § 12113.
57. Under the ADA, a public entity is "(A) any State or local government; (B) any depart-ment, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local gov-
ernment; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority."
Id. § 12131.
58. Id. § 12132.
59. Id. § 12134(c).
60. For the purposes of the ADA, the following locations are places of public accommoda-
tion, if the function of these entities have an effect on commerce-
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such
proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition
or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, phar-
macy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school,
or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
Id. § 12181(7). The term "commerce" is defined in the ADA as "travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication-(A) among the several States; (B) between any foreign country
or any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the same State but through
another State or foreign country." Id. § 12181(1).
61. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 35 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 317.
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cause they did not feel welcome, did not believe that such places Were safe due to
past discrimination, felt self-conscious about their disabilities, and faced insur-
mountable architectural and structural obstacles. 62
Finally, the ADA deals with telecommunications and common carriers.6 3 The
ADA requires that common carriers64 make telecommunications relay services
available to hearing-impaired and speech-impaired individuals. 65 Telecommuni-
cation relay services provide an individual with a hearing or speech impairment
with the ability to "engage in communication by wire or radio with a hearing indi-
vidual in a manner that is functionally equivalent to the ability of an individual
who does not have a hearing impairment or speech impairment to communicate
using voice communication services by wire or radio."'66
Ill. THE DIRECT THREAT EXCEPTION AND BRAGDON V. ABBOTT
A. The Direct Threat Exception
The goal of ADA was to protect disabled individuals from unfair discrimina-
tion. In its pursuit of equity, however, Congress did not lose sight of its obligation
to protect the collective interests of society. Congress provided two primary av-
enues to balance the potentially competing interests of individuals with disabilities
and the interests of society at large.
First, Congress allows employers to implement certain "qualification stan-
dards."'6 7 An employer may combat a charge of discrimination if he or she can
demonstrate that the "qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen
out or ... otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been
shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such perfor-
62. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 34-35 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316-17.
Discrimination in places of public accommodation includes denying qualified individuals the
opportunity to participate or benefit from the "goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of an entity." 42 U.S.C. § !2182(b)(l)(a)(i). It is also discriminatory, under
the ADA, to provide qualified individuals with a benefit that is unequal in comparison to a
benefit provided to other individuals, or benefit that is separate from that provided to other
individuals, unless the separation is necessary to effectively provide the benefit to the qualified
individual. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(a)(ii)-(iii). Unless structurally impractical, places of public ac-
commodation must also design and construct new facilities to accommodate individuals with
disabilities. Id. § 12183(a)(1). This requirement took effect on August 26, 1990. Id. If a
facility was constructed before the enactment of the ADA, any subsequent alterations must be
designed to accommodate individuals with disabilities. Id. § 12183(a)(2). The ADA does not,
however, require the installation of an elevator. Id. § 12183(b). The requirements of accommo-
dation also apply to specific public transportation services that are provided by private entities.
Id. § 12184.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000).
64. "The term 'common carrier' or 'carrier' includes any common carrier engaged in inter-
state communication by wire or radio as defined in section 153 of this title and any common
carrier engaged in intrastate communication by wire or radio, notwithstanding sections 152(b)
and 221(b) of this title." Id. § 225(a)(1).
65. Id. § 225(b)(1).
66. Id. § 225(a)(3).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
68. Id. The regulation defines "qualification standards" as "personal and professional at-
tributes including the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other require-
ments established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to
be eligible for the position held or desired." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (2002).
2003]
mance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation. '68 The statute pro-
vides that "qualification standards" may include a "requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace." 69
Second, the ADA expressly provides an exception to the prohibition on dis-
crimination if the disability "poses a direct threat to the health or safety of oth-
ers. ' 7 0 Under the statute, nothing in the Act requires:
an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where
such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term
"direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that can-
not be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services. 7 1
The regulation sheds some light on questions of statutory interpretation. 72
First, it makes clear that the existence of a "direct threat" is based on an individu-
alized evaluation of "the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of the job."'73 The assessment of an individual's ability is "based on a
reasonable medical judgment," relying on the most current and/or best available
objective medical knowledge.74 Second, the regulation provides the following
direct threat test: "In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat,
the factors to be considered include: (1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature
and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will
occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm."' 75
In constructing the direct threat exception, Congress codified the standard cre-
ated in the 1979 Supreme Court case, School Board v. Arline.76 Arline was an
elementary school teacher in Nassau County, Florida who was fired after her third
relapse of tuberculosis. 77 She filed suit in federal court alleging that the school
board violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because she was fired due to her
tuberculosis. 78 At trial, the superintendent of schools testified that Arline was, in
fact, fired because of the "'continued reoccurrence of tuberculosis.' 7 9 The dis-
trict court found in favor of the school board. 80 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
lower court's decision, holding that a contagious disease could be covered under
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
70. Id. § 12182(b)(3).
71. Id.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2002).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 338. "The determination that an individual with a disability will pose a safety threat to
others must be made on a case-by-case basis and must not be based on generalizations,
misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies."
Id.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
76. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). Congress codified the Arline decision and "the term 'direct threat'
is meant to connote the full standard set forth in the Arline decision." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11),
at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359.
77. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
78. Id. Arline filed suit in federal court only after a state administrative proceeding denied
her any relief. Id.
79. Id. (quoting testimony from superintendent of schools for Nassau County, Craig Marsh).
80. Id. at 277.
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the Act and remanded the case for further findings to determine whether Arline
was "'otherwise qualified"' for her job.8 1 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit.82
The Supreme Court first held that the "fact that a person with a record of a
physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from
coverage" under the Rehabilitation Act. 83 The Supreme Court then examined
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" to be an elementary schoolteacher.84 To
evaluate the existence of health and safety risks, the Court utilized the test estab-
lished in the amicus brief by the American Medical Association.85 The Court held
that in a situation involving the employment of a handicapped individual with a
contagious disease, the findings of fact should be based on the following:
Reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about (a)
the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk
(how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the poten-
tial harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted
and will cause varying degrees of harm.86
According to the Supreme Court, when making these findings, lower courts should
typically defer to the "reasonable medical judgments of public health officials."' 87
In light of these findings, the next step for the courts was to evaluate whether it
was possible for an employer to reasonably accommodate the handicapped em-
ployee. 88 The Supreme Court held that an individual with tuberculosis can fall
under the definition "handicapped" in the Rehabilitation Act but remanded the
case to determine whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary
school. 89
On remand, the district court emphasized the importance of the findings of
facts, which had to be based on "'reasonable medical judgments' given the state of
medical knowledge." 9 0 The court discussed, in great detail, the low probability of
transmitting tuberculosis through the air.9 1 The district court also examined the
81. Arline v. Sch. Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 765 (11th Cir. 1985).
82. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 277.
83. Id. at 286.
84. Id. at 287.
85. Id. at 288 (citing Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae).
86. Id. (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae).
87. Id. (footnote omitted). In an "employment context, an otherwise qualified person is one
who can perform 'the essential functions of the job in question."' Id. at 287 n. 17 (quoting 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)).
88. Id. at 288. An individual is "otherwise qualified" if he or she is able to meet "'all of a
program's requirements in spite of his [or her] handicap."' Id. at 287 n. 17 (quoting Southeastern
Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)). Reasonable accommodation is not required if
it poses an undue financial or administrative hardship on the employer or if the accommodation
would not overcome the effects of an individual's handicap. Id.
89. Id. at 288-89.
90. Arline v. Sch. Bd., 692 F Supp. 1286, 1291 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
91. Id. at 1287-88. Communication of the disease was extremely unlikely because when
"droplet nuclei are expelled from one person, almost all, or 99.9 [percent], of the nuclei die
within a second of contacting room air." Id. at 1288. The droplets that do survive must then
reach the distal portion, or the "microscopic air space," of the lungs of a person who inhales the
germs. Id. If a germ does reach the distal portion of a person's lungs, the body's immune system
is capable of "rendering it harmless." Id. at 1287-88. If the immune system does not render the
germ harmless, it can cause infection. Id. at 1288. However, only about five percent of infected
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communicability of the disease in relation to the importance of medical treatment. 92
Based on an examination of the nature, duration, and severity of the risk involved,
and the probability of transmission of tuberculosis, the district court held that the"risk of communication of tuberculosis by [Arline] and the risk of harm to others
•.. [did] not exist" and Arline was qualified to teach elementary school.9 3
The fact intensive analysis conducted by the district court is important be-
cause Congress codified the test set forth in Arline.94 This suggests that the Su-
preme Court signaled, in 1979, that the direct threat exception must be based on
objective medical evidence, not conjecture or theoretical possibilities of transmis-
sion. Because Congress codified the Arline test in its enactment of the ADA direct
threat exception, this provides evidence that Congress, as well as the Supreme
Court, has implicitly indicated that more than a theoretical possibility of transmis-
sion is necessary to invoke the direct threat exception.
B. Bragdon v. Abbott: HIV Can Constitute a Disability Under the ADA
In Bragdon v. Abbott,95 the Supreme Court confirmed that HIV could consti-
tute a disability under the ADA. In 1994, the plaintiff, Sidney Abbott, disclosed
her HIV status to her dentist, Randon Bragdon, on a patient registration form.96
During the examination, Bragdon discovered that Abbott had a cavity.97 Upon
discovering the cavity, Bragdon informed Abbott that he had a "policy against
filling cavities of HIV-positive patients" in his office. 9 8 He offered to fill the
cavity at a hospital for no additional charge for his services; however, under this
arrangement, Abbott would be responsible for the additional hospital fees. 99 Abbott
declined the offer and filed suit under Maine law and the ADA, alleging discrimi-
nation because of her disability. 100
The district court granted Abbott's motion for summary judgment based on a
finding that Abbott's HIV infection constituted a disability under the ADA. 10 1 In
its decision, the district court relied on an affidavit from Dr. Donald Wayne Marianos,
the Director of the Division of Oral Health of the Center for Disease Control and
individuals will experience a progression into the "disease within the first two years after infec-
tion" and only another five percent will develop the disease over the course of the individual's
life. Id. The district court's attention to detail is important because it provides evidence that the
intent of the "direct threat exception" was to provide a precise examination of the actual risk an
individual who has a contagious disease poses to the health and safety of others. Id.
92. Id. at 1288-89.
93. Id. at 1292.
94. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359.
95. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
96. Id. at 628-29.
97. Id. at 629.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Abbott sued under 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000). The relevant section of the statute
states "no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who.., operates a place of public accommoda-
tion." Id. § 12182(a). The court determined that the dentist's office constituted a place of public
accommodation because the term explicitly includes a "professional office of a health care pro-
vider." Id. § 12181(7)(F).
101. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 630 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585-87
(D. Me. 1995)).
[Vol. 55:2
HIV AND THE ADA: WHAT IS A DIRECT THREAT?
Prevention (CDC).10 2 The affidavit indicated that, as long as dentists take "uni-
versal precautions," it is safe to treat HIV-positive patients in a dental office. 103
The First Circuit affirmed this decision, holding that Abbott's HIV infection
was a disability, despite the fact that her infection had not advanced to the symp-
tomatic stage. 104 The First Circuit also held that treating an HIV-positive patient
in a dental office would not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of oth-
ers. 105 Instead of relying on the affidavit of Dr. Marianos, the circuit court relied
on the 1993 CDC Guidelines and the Policy on AIDS, HIV Infection and the Prac-
tice of Dentistry, which was published by the American Dental Association. 106
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and focused on whether her HIV status
constituted a disability under the ADA. 107 The Supreme Court affirmed the First
Circuit, holding that Abbott's HIV status was a disability under the ADA. 108 The
Court utilized a three-step approach in its analysis. 10 9 First, the Court considered
whether Abbott's HIV infection constituted a "physical impairment."'110 Second,
the Court examined the life activities that Abbott relied upon, reproduction and
child bearing, to determine whether it was a "major life activity" under the ADA. '11
Finally, the Court combined the phrases "physical impairment" and "major life
activity" to examine whether the "impairment substantially limited the major life
activity." 112
In its first step, the Court relied on the regulations interpreting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, which were promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), to determine whether or not HIV was a "physical impairment." 113
Because HIV is not included in the list of specific disorders that constitute physi-
cal impairment, 114 the Court had to compare the definition of "physical impair-
ment" to the physical impact of HIV to determine whether or not asymptomatic
HIV constituted a disability. 115 In assessing whether or not HIV infection was a
physical impairment, the Supreme Court addressed the complexity of the disease
in great detail, basing its analysis on the wealth of medical information available. 116
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. at 589). The "universal precautions" are
explained in the CDC's 1993 guidelines and indicate that it is safe to treat HIV-positive patients
in the dental office. Id.
104. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-43 (1st Cir. 1997)).
105. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 943-48).
106. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 945-46).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 631.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. In its construction of the statute, the Court relied upon definitions found in previous
statutes, as well as interpretations from administrative agencies that had previously analyzed the
matter. Id.
113. Id. at 632 (citing 45 C.FR. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1997)). The Court relied on this definition
heavily because HEW was the agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
the Rehabilitation Act and the definition of physical impairment appears, without change, in the
current regulation. Id.
114. The Court notes that one reason HIV is not included in the list of specific disorders is
because HIV was not recognized as the cause of AIDS until 1983, long after the regulation was
promulgated. Id. at 633.
115. Id. at 633-37.
116. Id. at 634-37.
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The Court determined that HIV has an immediate and devastating physical impact
on the infected individual and, based on this conclusion, held that "HIV infection
satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment during
every stage of the disease" from the moment of infection, whether it is symptom-
atic or asymptomatic. 117
The Court then examined whether or not Abbott's physical impairment af-
fected a "major life activity." 118 In this case, Abbott maintained that her HIV
infection limited her ability to reproduce and bear children. 119 Although the Court
limited its analysis to the reproduction issue, it acknowledged that other HIV-posi-
tive parties could present legal arguments that HIV infection substantially limits
other major life activities. 120 The Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit's
definition of a "major life activity," which stated "'the plain meaning of the word"major" denotes comparative importance' and 'suggests that the touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance.' 1 2 1
The Supreme Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals's holding that reproduc-
tion fell within the definition of a "major life activity" because "reproduction and
the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life processes itself."'122
The Supreme Court then considered whether Abbott's physical impairment"substantially limited [her] major life activity." 123 The Court held that Abbott's
HIV infection substantially limited her capacity to reproduce in two ways. First,
the Court held that an HIV-positive woman who tries to conceive a child inflicts a
"significant risk" of infection on her male partner. 124 Second, the Court concluded
that HIV substantially limits a woman's reproductive rights because a woman who
is infected with HIV risks infecting her child during pregnancy and during child-
117. Id. at 637.
118. Id.
119. Id. Although the Court limited its analysis to the reproduction issue, it did acknowledge
that other HIV-positive parties could present legal arguments that HIV infection substantially
limits other major life activities. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 638 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 939, 940 (1st Cir. 1997)).
122. Id. The Supreme Court rejected Bragdon's claim that Congress intended to limit the
reach of ADA to cover a person's activities only if they involve a "public, economic, or daily
character." Id. First, the Court determined that the definition of "major life activity" did not
suggest that activities outside the rubric of public, economic, or daily are not covered under the
ADA. Id. In fact, the "breadth of the term" is contrary to such limitation. Id. Second, because
the ADA must be consistent with the Rehabilitation Act regulations, it is necessary to look at the
regulations for guidance. Id. The regulation provides an illustrative, but not exclusive, list of
major life activities, such as "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing." Id. at 638-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.FR. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)).
The Court determined that the regulation supports the argument that reproduction is a "major
life activity" because "reproduction cannot be regarded as any less important than working and
learning." Id. at 639. Because Bragdon did not provide a sufficient reason to support his claim
that reproduction was not a major life activity, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals determina-
tion that reproduction was a "major life activity." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. After reviewing the available medical data, the Court found that "[tihe cumulative
results of 13 studies collected in a 1994 textbook on AIDS indicates that 20% of male partners of
women with HIV became HIV-positive themselves, with a majority of the studies finding a
statistically significant risk of infection." Id. at 640.
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birth. 12 5 The Court listed a number of medical sources that placed the risk of
transmission from mother to child between fourteen and forty percent, noting that
many studies place the risk of transmission between the ranges of twenty-five to
thirty percent. 126 Although a woman who is HIV-positive can conceive and bear
children, the Court determined that conception and childbirth constituted a danger
to the public health and that this danger met the definition of substantial limitation
under the Act. 127 Because the Court held Abbott's HIV infection was a physical
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, the Court did not ad-
dress whether HIV infection is per se a disability under the Act. 128 Therefore, the
determination of whether or not HIV infection is a disability under the ADA is fact
specific.
After holding that asymptomatic HIV may constitute a disability under the
ADA, the Supreme Court examined the direct threat issue. If her condition "pose[d]
a direct threat to the health or safety of others," Bragdon's refusal to treat Abbott
would have been legal, even though Abbott was disabled for purposes of the Act. 129
The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the direct threat issue to the circuit court.
However, before doing so, the Court set forth guidelines for the lower courts to
follow and also provided signals for constructing an appropriate burden of proof
structure. 130
First, the Court outlined the guidelines for evaluating a direct threat claim. It
acknowledged the need to apply the Arline test to determine the existence of a
direct threat. 13 1 The Court then discussed the type of evidence necessary by stat-
ing that the "existence, or nonexistence, of a significant risk must be determined
from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accommodation,
and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence." 132
Thus, as a health care professional, Bragdon had a duty to evaluate "the risk of
infection based on the objective, scientific information available to him and others
125. Id. The Court listed a number of medical sources that placed the risk of transmission
from mother to child between fourteen and forty percent, noting that many studies place the risk
of transmission between the ranges of twenty-five to thirty percent. Id. The Supreme Court
rejected Bragdon's argument that HIV infection does not substantially limit the ability of an
HIV-positive woman to reproduce because of the existence of antiretroviral therapy, which can
reduce the risk of perinatal transmission to approximately eight percent. Id. The Court held that
the reduced percentage is irrelevant because the Court refused to decide that, as a matter of law,
an eight percent risk of transmitting a fatal infection from mother to child is not a substantial
limitation on a woman's ability to reproduce. Id. at 641.
126. Id.
127. Id. The decision of an HIV-infected woman to bear children also carries with it eco-
nomic and legal consequences. Id. In its decision, the Supreme Court considered the fact that it
is more expensive for an HIV-infected woman to bear a child due to the cost of antiretroviral
therapy, supplemental insurance, and long-term medical expenses for a child that must be tested
and, if infected with HIV, treated for the infection. Id. Furthermore, the Court considered the
fact that some states actually forbid HIV infected individuals from engaging in sexual inter-
course, regardless of consent. Id. (citing the following statutes: IOWA CODE §§ 139.1, 139.31
(1997); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-601.1(a) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-101,
50-18-112 (1997); UTAH CODEANN. § 26-6-3.5(3) (Supp. 1997); Id. § 26-6-5 (1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.36.011(1)(b) (Supp. 1998)). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1997).
128. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 641-42.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2000).
130. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 649.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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in his profession," not merely a good faith subjective belief.133 According to the
Court, a doctor's reasonableness must be considered "in light of the available medi-
cal evidence." 134 In its review of the medical evidence, the Court indicated that
public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, and the National Institute of Health, were particularly credible
sources. 135 Although the Court deemed these sources especially important, it also
indicated that an individual could contest the prevailing view by rebutting it with
credible scientific evidence for "deviating from the norm."136
When the Court applied these standards to Abbott, it signaled that an intense
examination of the facts, accompanied by specific, objective medical evidence,
was necessary. Although the Supreme Court substantially agreed with the First
Circuit's findings, there was some expression of concern. The Supreme Court
called for a reexamination of the circuit court's reliance on the CDC Dentistry
Guidelines and the American Dental Association Policy on HIV.137 The Court's
concern about CDC guidelines stemmed from the fact that the guidelines provided
only recommended methods of preventing HIV transmission, but did not evaluate
the risk of transmission. 138 The Supreme Court's uncertainty about the American
Dental Association Policy on HIV arose because, even though the policy provided
some objective evidence regarding the risk of transmission, the American Dental
Association was a professional organization, not a public health agency. 139 The
Court indicated that, in order to make a decision about the objective credibility of
the organization's policy, it needed more information about the formulation of the
American Dental Association's position. 140 The Court also noted that Bragdon's
evidence was based on speculation and inconclusive data, 14 1 which was problem-
atic because "[s]cientific evidence and expert testimony must have a traceable,
analytical basis in objective fact before it may be considered on summary judg-
ment." 142
The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the direct threat issue for two rea-
sons. First, the Court determined that a complete briefing on this particular issue
133. Id.
134. Id. at 650.
135. Id.
136. Id. (referring to W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 187 (5th
ed. 1984)).
137. Id. at 651 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 945-46 (1st Cir. 1997)).
138. Id. at 651-52.
139. Id. at 652.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 653. For example, Bragdon maintained that "the use of high-speed drills and [the]
surface cooling with water created a risk of airborne HIV transmission"; however, the study that
Bragdon relied on was inconclusive and expressly stated that additional research was necessary.
Id. In addition, his own expert witness admitted that there was no evidence suggesting that HIV
could be transmitted by the spray from the drill and his opinion was based only on the lack of
evidence to the contrary. Id. Bragdon also argued that, as of September 1994, CDC identified"seven dental workers with possible occupational transmission of HIV." Id. at 653-54. How-
ever, this is most likely insufficient evidence because the CDC could not determine whether or
not the workers contracted the HIV infection because the workers did not get tests at the appro-
priate time. Id. at 654 (citing Gooch et al., Percutaneous Exposures to HIV-Infected Blood
Among Dental Workers Enrolled in the CDC Needlestick Study, 126 J. AM. DENTAL Ass'N 1237,
1239 (1995)).
142. Id. at 653 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45, 146 (1997)).
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would "help place a complex factual record in proper perspective."' 14 3 Second,
the Court believed that the resolution of the direct threat issue would be important
for the "precision and comprehensiveness of the reasons given for the decision." 144
Although the Supreme Court believed that its remand would "permit a full explo-
ration of the issue," 145 a controversy has erupted regarding the amount of evi-
dence necessary to constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of others.
IV. DIRECT THREAT EXCEPTION IN DIFFERENT CIRCUITS
A. HIV and Direct Threat in the Circuit Courts
Circuit courts approach the direct threat exception to discrimination for HIV-
positive individuals differently. First and Ninth Circuit decisions require that those
trying to invoke the exception provide precise and concrete evidence of a direct
threat to the health and safety of others. 146 However, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits require significantly less evidence to successfully invoke the
direct threat exception to discrimination, during both the summary judgment and
trial phases. 147
B. The First Circuit
The First Circuit confronted the direct threat issue when the Supreme Court
remanded Bragdon to resolve the question of whether Abbott's HIV status was a
direct threat to the health and safety of others. 148 Focusing on Abbott's evidence,
the circuit court first addressed the Supreme Court's concern regarding the 1993
CDC guidelines. 149 The court examined the history of the guidelines and ana-
lyzed the 1986 and 1987 publications. 150 The First Circuit found that the
"[g]uidelines [were] competent evidence that public health authorities considered
treatment of the kind that Ms. Abbott required to be safe, if undertaken using uni-
versal precautions."' 15 1
143. Id.
144. Id. at 654-55. In its decision to remand this portion of the case, the Court made clear
that its decision did not foreclose the possibility that the Court of Appeals would reach the same
conclusion. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court, in its decision, was seeking clarity. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998); Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court, 840 F.2d 701, 710-12 (9th Cir. 1988).
147. See Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1299-1301 (11th Cir. 1999); Estate of Mauro v.
Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50
F.3d 1261, 1268 (4th Cir. 1995); Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d
922, 924 (5th Cir. 1993).
148. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 654-55.
149. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 89.
150. Id. In its assessment of the 1993 Guidelines, the First Circuit noted that the 1993
version of the universal precaution guidelines was intended to be a modification, not a retreat
from earlier guidelines. Id. The 1987 edition explained that the "use of the universal precau-
tions eliminates the need for additional precautions that the CDC formerly had advocated for
handling blood and other bodily fluids known or suspected to be infected with bloodbome patho-
gens." Id.
151. Id.
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Judge Selya then examined the court's earlier reliance on the American Dental
Association policy.152 In its decision to remand the direct threat issue, the Su-
preme Court had expressed concern that the policy may be biased if the Associa-
tion relied too heavily on the ethical obligations of dentists, instead of reliable
scientific evidence. 153 On remand, the circuit court received a supplemental briefing
that contained information about the construction of the policy. 154 The court learned
that the Association divided its scientific and ethical policies into two separate
procedures, which were developed by different groups of experts and staff mem-
bers. 155 The separation of the scientific and ethical research, as well as the cre-
dentials of the professionals creating the policy, provided the First Circuit with
sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that the policy was scientifically
valid.156
The circuit court held that reliance on both the policy and guidelines was
proper. 157 In addition to these detailed and scientifically based sources, the First
Circuit also noted that Abbott offered a plethora of other evidence in support of her
position. 158 For example, she presented "several prominent experts," all indicat-
ing that her cavity could be filled safely in a private dental office, and proof that no
public health agency had issued warnings disfavoring this type of treatment. 159
Upon reevaluation, the court concluded that Abbott "served a properly documented
motion for summary judgment." 160
After a careful analysis of Abbott's evidence, the court examined whether
Bragdon's evidence presented sufficient evidence of a direct threat in order to cre-
ate a genuine issue of material fact. 16 1 First, the circuit court addressed the Su-
preme Court's concern about the CDC's seven cases of possible HIV patient-to-
dental worker transmission. 162 According to the CDC definition, the term "pos-
sible transmission" is used if a "stricken worker," who claimed to have no other
possible explanation for the HIV infection, "simply failed to present himself for
testing after being exposed to the virus at work." 163 Because the Supreme Court
required that an "objective standard" apply when assessing the existence of a di-
rect threat, the circuit court held that the list of seven "possible" cases of patient-
to-worker transmissions did not create a genuine issue of material fact. 16 4
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The First Circuit revealed that the seventeen members of the Association's Council
on Scientific Affairs and their staff drafted the policy relied on by the court. Id. The ethical
policies, on the other hand, where drafted by a completely separate entity, the Council on Ethics.
Id. Although the Association's House of Delegates approved these policies, the court deter-
mined its separate origin of policy was sufficient to establish the scientific credibility of the
policy. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court indicated that these materials alone where likely sufficient to prove that
the direct threat exception did not apply in this case. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 89-90 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 652-53 (1998)).
163. Id. at 90.
164. Id.
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Second, in his supplemental briefing, Bragdon referred to forty-two "docu-
mented cases of occupational transmission of HIV to health-care workers (none of
whom were dental workers)" reported by the CDC.165 As in his initial argument,
Bragdon claimed that the transmission cases were analogous to his situation be-
cause the risks faced by a dentist are similar to those faced by other health care
professionals. 16 6 He argued that these cases should "be extrapolated to create an
issue of fact as to the degree of risk" he faced as a dentist. 167 The First Circuit did
not agree with Bragdon's analogy and did not believe that this evidence was sub-
stantial enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. 16 8 Accordingly, the
circuit court upheld its prior decision that Bragdon's "evidence was insufficient
without a documented showing that the risks to dentists and other health care workers
[were] comparable." 16 9 In its decision, the circuit court noted that the Supreme
Court did not challenge its position on requiring such documentation, suggesting
that the Court agreed with the high bar of proof set by the First Circuit in this
case. 170
In the final section of its opinion, the First Circuit made an important observa-
tion and issued a significant piece of advice to other courts when it declared that
"the state of scientific knowledge concerning this disease is evolving, and we cau-
tion future courts to consider carefully whether future litigants have been able,
through scientific advances, more complete research, or special circumstances, to
present facts and arguments warranting a different decision." 17 1 The Supreme
Court subsequently declined to grant Bragdon's petition for certiorari. 172 This
provides further evidence that the Supreme Court agrees with the First Circuit's
requirement that, in order to invoke the direct threat exception, the moving party
must present comprehensive, objective medical evidence that a direct threat, rather
than a mere theoretical possibility of transmission, exists.
C. The Ninth Circuit
In Chalk v. United States District Court,173 the Ninth Circuit established an
exacting standard to prove that an individual with HIV posed a direct threat to the
health and safety of others. The case was decided in 1988, two years before the
enactment of the ADA. It continues, however, to be important because the stan-
dards set forth for carriers of contagious diseases under the Rehabilitation Act are
the same as the direct threat standard in the ADA, that is, the application of the
Arline test.
In Chalk, Vincent Chalk was a certified teacher for hearing-impaired students
in the Orange County Department of Education. 174 Diagnosed with AIDS in Feb-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The First Circuit believed that every piece of evidence that Bragdon presented was"still 'too speculative or too tangential (or in some instances, both) to create a genuine issue of
material fact."' Id. (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Bragdon v. Abbott, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999).
173. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
174. Id. at 703.
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ruary of 1987, Chalk was hospitalized for eight weeks. 175 When his doctor found
him fit to return to work, the school department placed him on administrative leave
pending a consultation with an expert. 176 The school department's expert de-
clared that Chalk could return to work in August.17 7 In August, the school depart-
ment allowed Chalk to return to work, but reassigned him to an administrative
position. 17 8 In this position, he had the option of working at the department's
administrative office or from home, but the department prohibited him from teach-
ing. 179 Although he received the same pay and benefits, the new administrative
position was very different from that of a teacher in a classroom. 180 The School
Department notified Chalk that if he insisted on returning to the classroom envi-
ronment, it would file for declaratory relief.18 1
When Chalk refused to accept the administrative offer, the School Depart-
ment filed an action in Orange County Superior Court. 182 Chalk simultaneously
filed an action in federal district court for a preliminary and permanent injunction
to bar the Department from excluding him from the classroom and ordering the
Department to reinstate him pending trial. 18 3 The district court denied his mo-
tion. 184 A circuit court panel granted Chalk's motion for an expedited appeal but
denied his emergency petition for a writ of mandamus. 185 Chalk then filed an
injunction pending the appeal in an emergency motion. 186 The Ninth Circuit ana-
lyzed Chalk's claim under a deferential standard of review, only reversing if there
was an abuse of discretion or if the lower court relied on an erroneous legal con-
clusion. 18 7
In its analysis of Chalk's probable success on the merits, the Ninth Circuit
examined the evidence in relation to the language of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which prohibits otherwise qualified individuals from participating in a pro-
gram that receives federal financial assistance solely because the individual has a
175. Id.
176. Id. The Department hired Dr. Thomas J. Prendergast, the Director of Epidemiology and
Disease Control for the Orange County Health Care Agency, to serve as its expert in determina-
tion of the matter. Id.
177. Id. at 703 n.4.
178. Id. at 703.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 703-04.
184. Id. at 704.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir.
1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n
v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980)). The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to maintain the status quo during the adjudication of a case on its merits. Id. (citing
L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980)).
To meet its burden on proof, the party moving for a preliminary judgment must establish either
"(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or
(2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Id.
(citing L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.
1980); Benda v. Grand Lodge of Intern. Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d
308, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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handicap. 188 The circuit court recognized that under Arline, the Rehabilitation
Act applied to individuals with contagious diseases. 189 It then applied the direct
threat test established in Arline. 190
The court examined the evidence presented by Chalk in support of a prelimi-
nary injunction. 19 1 Chalk submitted over one hundred articles from credible medical
journals, statements from five experts, and reports from the Surgeon General of
the United States, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences,
the American Medical Association, and the United States Centers for Disease Con-
trol to support his position that his AIDS/HIV status did not present a direct threat
to his students. 192 The evidence he presented showed that "[e]xtensive and nu-
merous studies have consistently found no apparent risk of HIV infection to indi-
viduals exposed through close, non-sexual contact with AIDS patients."'19 3 The
Surgeon General's report specifically discussed the risk of transmitting the disease
in a classroom environment, stating that "' [n]one of the identified cases of AIDS
in the United States are known or are suspected to have been transmitted from one
child to another in school, day care or foster care settings ... [and c]asual social
contact between children and persons infected with the AIDS virus is not danger-
ous.' 19 4
The Department, on the other hand, did not present a comparable amount of
scientific evidence. 195 Instead, the Department offered only one medical witness
to suggest that there was a "'probability, small though it is, that there are vectors of
transmission as yet not clearly defined.' 196 When the Department's expert, Dr.
Armentrout, was asked if he had a scientific basis for his hypothesis, he stated that
he did not have any "'scientific evidence that would enable me to answer that or
have an opinion.., what we [are] saying is that we haven't proved scientifically a
vector."' 197
After reviewing the evidence presented by both Chalk and the Department,
the Ninth Circuit found that the district court improperly relied upon the
Department's speculation, which lacked any medical support. 19 8 The reliance on
such speculation resulted in a failure to follow the Arline test and placed an imper-
missibly high burden of proof on Chalk. 199 The Ninth Circuit determined that
"the transmission of the AIDS virus in the classroom setting was 'a mere theoreti-
cal possibility' and that exclusion of AIDS victims on that basis would violate" the
Rehabilitation Act.20 0 Because Chalk submitted a plethora of evidence in support
of his position and the Department did not prove that transmission was anything
more than a theoretical possibility, the Ninth Circuit held that Chalk demonstrated
a strong probability of success on the merits and should be granted a preliminary
188. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794).
189. Id. (citing Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987)).
190. Id. (citing Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276).
191. Id. at 706.
192. Id. at 706-07.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 706.
195. Id. at 707.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 707-08.
199. Id. at 707.
200. Id. at 708.
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Chalk continues to be an important decision because it provides early evi-
dence that a standard that allows the invocation of a direct threat exception merely
because there is a "theoretical possibility" of transmission is insufficient. The
Ninth Circuit made this decision in 1988, at a time when the medical and legal
communities knew much less about HIV. Nevertheless, the court believed that
sound, objective medical evidence was required in order to prevent unfair preju-
dice. This exacting, objective standard should serve as a model, along with the
First Circuit, of the evidence needed to invoke the direct threat exception for HIV-
positive individuals.
D. The Fourth Circuit
Unlike the First and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit has not required the
same heightened level of objective medical evidence. The Fourth Circuit first
encountered the question of when HIV constitutes a direct threat to the health and
safety of others in a 1995 case, Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System
Corp.202 In this case, Dr. Doe, a neurosurgeon in his third year of residency,
discovered that he was HIV-positive. 203 Dr. Doe was suspended while the hospital's
panel of experts examined the issue.204 The panel ultimately recommended that
Dr. Doe be permitted to return to his surgical practice and perform the same proce-
dures, with the exception of those procedures that involved the use of exposed
wire.20 5 The panel further recommended that Dr. Doe be required to rigorously
abide by infection control procedures, notify the hospital and patient if his blood
ever contacted a patient's "non-intact skin," and that Dr. Doe provide the hospital
a sample of his blood so that "if a patient claimed to have contract[ed] HIV from
Dr. Doe, the DNA... could be compared."'206 The panel did not recommend that
Dr. Doe be required to gather patient informed consents before performing sur-
gery.2 07 Despite the panel's recommendation, the hospital administrators perma-
nently suspended Dr. Doe from his surgical practice but did offer Dr. Doe alterna-
tive residencies in nonsurgical fields. 208
The hospital stated that it decided to revoke Dr. Doe's surgical privileges based
on guidelines issued by the CDC concerning HIV-positive health care workers. 209
It is important to note, however, that the CDC's recommendations stated that HIV-
201. Id. at 708-09.
202. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
203. Id. at 1262. In 1992, Dr. Doe was pricked with a needle while treating a person who
may have had the HIV virus. Id. He "subsequently tested positive for [the] HIV" virus. id.
However, at the time of the case, it was not known whether Dr. Doe contracted the virus from the
needle prick or was previously exposed to the virus. Id. at 1262 n.4.
204. Id. at 1262.
205. Id. The panel determined that the medical procedures that involved the use of wire
presented too high a risk of transmission to patients. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1263.
209. Id. (citing Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Recom-
mendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B
Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1, 3-4 (July 12, 1991) [hereinafter CDC, Recommendations]).
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positive surgeons should not be banned from "performing most surgical proce-
dures" as long as the surgeon strictly followed the CDC's universal precautions. 2 10
In order to get around the CDC's position, the hospital and the court relied heavily
on the CDC's distinction between the "large class of invasive procedures," such as
inserting intravenous lines, and the "limited class of 'exposure-prone' procedures,
which involve greater risk of... skin piercing." 2 11 To overcome the CDC's posi-
tion, the hospital and Fourth Circuit also emphasized the CDC recommendation
that individual hospitals should identify their own exposure prone procedures to
determine whether or not an HIV-positive surgeon should participate in the sur-
gery.2 12 In support of its position that Dr. Doe posed a direct threat to the health
and safety of others, the hospital cited a skin-piercing study, which indicated that
skin piercing occurs in about 6.9% of surgeries. 2 13 Dr. Doe attempted to rebut the
accuracy and applicability of the study because it did not analyze the amount of
blood-to-blood contact from skin-piercing injuries and, therefore, did not address
the risk of transmitting HIV.2 14 The court, however, paid little attention to Dr.
Doe's efforts to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Based upon the theories above, the hospital argued that Dr. Doe posed a direct
threat under Arline because "(1) HIV may be transmitted via blood-to-blood con-
tact in a surgical setting; (2) Dr. Doe will always be infectious; (3) infection with
HIV is invariably fatal; and (4) there is an ascertainable risk that Dr. Doe will
transmit the disease during the course of his neurosurgical residency."2 15 Dr. Doe
acknowledged that the first three prongs of the Arline test weighed in favor of a
direct threat finding; however, he pointed out that the risk of transmission was "so
infinitesimal that it cannot, regardless of the degree of harm involved," constitute
a direct threat. 2 16 Dr. Doe also maintained that only a spinal fusion, which in-
volved the use of a wire, qualified as exposure prone under the CDC Recommen-
dations. 2 17 He argued that because of this, reasonable accommodation was pos-
sible because Dr. Doe could perform all surgeries except the spinal fusion.2 18 The
Fourth Circuit did not agree with Dr. Doe and, instead, upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the hospital.2 19
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because HIV can be transmit-
ted through blood-to-blood contact, it is possible for an HIV-positive surgeon to
transmit the disease to a patient.220 The court brushed aside the fact that, although
there were known instances of HIV-positive surgeons operating on patients, there
were no documented cases of HIV-positive surgeons transmitting the disease to
patients. 22 1 Furthermore, the circuit court minimized the fact that the risk of trans-
mission, estimated somewhere between 1 in 42,000 and 1 in 417,000, was exceed-
ingly small.2 22 The court instead chose to focus on the fact that the CDC allowed
210. Id. (citing CDC, Recommendations at 5).
211. Id. at 1263-64 (citing CDC, Recommendations at 4).
212. Id. at 1264 (citing CDC, Recommendations at 4).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1264 n.6.
215. Id. at 1265.
216. Id. at 1266.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1267.
220. Id. at 1263.
221. Id. at 1263 n.5.
222. Id.
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hospitals some leeway to define "exposure prone." 22 3 The circuit court used this
fact to determine that it was reasonable for the hospital to label Dr. Doe's respon-
sibilities as exposure prone in order to constitute a direct threat. 224 Finally, be-
cause the risk of transmission could never be fully eliminated, the Fourth Circuit
took a "cautious" approach to the direct threat rule and held that summary judg-
ment was appropriate. 225
This case is particularly troubling because it was decided by the grant of sum-
mary judgment. The facts presented by Dr. Doe regarding the nature of his posi-
tion, the possibility of reasonable accommodation, and the admittedly small risk of
transmission seem, at the very least, to create a genuine issue of material fact. The
existence of some risk of transmission, such as I in 42,000 or 1 in 417,000, does
not, in and of itself, create a direct threat.
The Fourth Circuit revisited the direct threat issue in Montalvo v. Radcliffe.226
In this case, a twelve-year-old boy, Michael Montalvo, was not allowed to enroll in
a traditional Japanese style martial arts school because he was HIV-positive. 227
Unlike the popular family style karate, the U.S.A. Bushidokan martial arts school
focused on a combat style karate that involved significant body contact and fre-
quent bloody injuries. 22 8 When Radcliffe, the program's owner, learned that
Michael was HIV-positive he offered to conduct private lessons for Michael but
his parents refused the proposal. 229 Instead, the family filed a discrimination suit
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 230 The district court conducted a bench
trial, ultimately holding that Michael's participation in the U.S.A. Bushidokan pro-
gram presented a direct threat to the health and safety of others and that reasonable
accommodation, by making the program softer, was not feasible. 23 1
The district court relied on testimony from Radcliffe, which indicated that
blood from injuries sustained during combat was "'extremely likely"' to spill onto
other students and universal precautions would not eliminate such occurrences. 232
The district court relied upon this information in conjunction with expert testi-
mony, which indicated that transmission of HIV is possible with blood-to-blood
contact.23 3 The court then applied the Arline standard and determined that Michael
posed a direct threat to the health and safety of the other karate participants. 234
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's holding based on the Arline test. 235
In its analysis, the court of appeals stated that "the gravity of one factor might well
compensate for the relative slightness of another... [and] when the disease at risk
of transmission is ... severe and inevitably fatal, even a low probability of trans-
223. Id. at 1266.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1267.
226. 167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999).
227. Id. at 874.
228. Id. The program's owner, Radcliffe, testified that, in this form of karate participants are
frequently scratched or gouged and often sustain bloody lips, bloody noses, bruises, or other
similar injuries. Id. at 875.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 876.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 878.
235. Id. at 879.
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mission could still create a significant risk."'2 36
The opinion is interesting because it states that the testimony of Radcliffe's
medical expert, a private physician, "[was] not critical to the district court's factual
findings since the Montalvos' expert reached essentially the same conclusion about
the nature of transmitting HIV," that HIV can be transmitted by blood-to-blood
contact. 237 This leads to two conclusions. First, because the court did not rely on
medical opinions, its decision could not be based on "reasonable medical evidence"
that Michael posed a direct threat to others. 238 This proposition is supported by
the fact that the circuit court explicitly stated that it did not rely on expert testi-
mony, which was the defendant's primary source of medical evidence. 239 Sec-
ond, the intense focus on the nature of HIV led the court to neglect an important
element in determining the existence of a direct threat-that the possibility of trans-
mission be based on medical evidence. In this case, there was no medical evidence
presented regarding the probability of transmitting the disease in this combat style
environment. Instead, the court relied on the blanket notion that because blood-to-
blood contact could transmit HIV, and because the combat can lead to blood spill-
age, it must be a significant risk. It failed, however, to take the necessary analyti-
cal step of assessing this risk based on the medical evidence.
The Fourth Circuit also held that no reasonable accommodation was feasible
because any softening of the program would diminish its intent.240 The court also
determined that Radcliffe's offer to conduct private lessons with Michael satisfied
the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement because the ADA "does not
require U.S.A. Bushidokan to abandon its essential mission and to offer a funda-
mentally different program of instruction., 24 1
This case exemplifies the problems with relying on a more "cautious" ap-
proach to the direct threat issue in relation to HIV-positive individuals. Because
the Fourth Circuit did not rely on exacting and objective medical evidence, the
court substituted its interpretation of the existence of a direct threat for that of a
medical expert. This is a contradiction of the directive set forth by the Supreme
Court both in Arline and Bragdon.
E. The Fifth Circuit
In Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,242 the Fifth
Circuit dealt with the issue of whether an HIV-positive surgical assistant presented
a direct threat under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.243 Brian Bradley was a surgi-
cal assistant at the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center and, in July
of 1991, he revealed to a local newspaper that he was HIV-positive and employed
by the hospital. 244 After publication of the story, the hospital reassigned him to
the purchasing department as a procurement assistant.24 5 Bradley sued the hospi-
236. Id. at 878.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 879.
241. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000)).
242. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 923.
245. Id.
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tal claiming that the reassignment violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.246 The
district court granted summary judgment for the hospital . 247
The Fifth Circuit decided this case in 1993 and the court disposed of the issue
quickly and without great detail. 24 8 The court relied on the Arline test to deter-
mine whether or not Bradley was "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential
functions of his job.249 The disputed issue in the case was the probability of Bra-
dley transmitting HIV to patients. According to the Fifth Circuit, the nature of
Bradley's job created some risk because in his occupational field Bradley came
within inches of patients' open wounds, placed his hands in a patient's body cavity
once a day, handed "the handles of instruments to surgeons while he [held] the
sharp end," and had suffered "five needle puncture wounds while on the job." 250
Despite the findings above, the circuit court still recognized that the "risk,
while present, [was] not large."'25 1 Like the Fourth Circuit, however, the Fifth
Circuit chose to focus its attention on the CDC "exposure prone" recommenda-
tion. 252 The court used this CDC report to hold that although the risk was small, it
was "not so low as to nullify the catastrophic consequences of an accident. A
cognizable risk of permanent duration with lethal consequences suffice[d] to make
a surgical technician with Bradley's responsibilities" a direct threat.25 3 The Fifth
Circuit also held that reasonable accommodation was not feasible because the hos-
pital would be required to use another assistant to perform the essential functions
Bradley could not perform. 254 The circuit court, therefore, upheld the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the hospital.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis, encapsulated in a two page per curiam opinion,
raises serious questions about the court's use, or lack thereof, of objective medical
evidence. Although it alleges to base its decision on the probability, not the possi-
bility, of transmission, the court focuses only on the fact that transmission is pos-
sible and only eludes to probability when it asserts that the risk of transmission is"small. '255 Unlike the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which at least provided esti-
mates of the probability of transmission, this court does not present any empirical
evidence regarding the probability of transmission. Instead, it decides, without
any real finding of facts, to equate "small" with "significant" for purposes of up-
holding the summary judgment. Bradley's arguments seem to indicate at least the
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Although this case occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624 (1998), this case remains good law in the Fifth Circuit and is still cited as authority
in other jurisdictions that choose to utilize a less stringent evidence requirement. E.g., Estate of
Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 401 (6th Cir. 1998).
249. Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d at 924.
250. Id. It is interesting that the court uses the terms assistant, technician, and technologist
interchangeably. In Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 137 F.3d at 404, the parties
distinguished between the titles because these positions involved different responsibilities and,
therefore, the probability of transmission could theoretically be different.
251. Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d at 924.
252. Id. (citing Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Recom-
mendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B
Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1 (July 12, 1991)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 925.
255. Id. at 924.
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existence of a genuine issue of material fact, thus making summary judgment in-
appropriate.2 56
F. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit first encountered the direct threat issue in Estate ofMauro v.
Borgess Medical Center.257 William Mauro was an HIV-positive operating room
technician. 258 When the hospital learned of Mauro's HIV status, officials offered
him an administrative position, which he refused. 259 The hospital then created a
taskforce to examine the situation and ultimately terminated Mauro because offi-
cials believed his job, which allegedly required him to put his hand in a patient's
body cavity, made him a direct threat to the health and safety of others.260 Mauro
filed an action against Borgess Medical Center, his former employer, alleging that
the hospital violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act when the administration fired him.26 1 The district court granted the hospital's
motion for summary judgment because the court determined that Mauro "posed a
direct threat to the health and safety of others." '26 2
Interestingly, the district court purported to base its decision in large part on
the "probability that the disease would be transmitted. '26 3 Instead of looking at
statistical data regarding the probability of transmission, however, the court relied
on Mauro's testimony that he was "'occasionally required to place his hands"' on
or into the patient's incision, and that the possibility of a needle prick or sustaining
a minor laceration existed.2 64 The district court also believed that Mauro's expert
acknowledged that a risk, but not necessarily a significant risk, existed if an oper-
ating technician put his hands onto an incision, had exposure to a needle prick, or
had a minor cut.265 Finally, the district court cited Doe v. University of Maryland
Medical System Corp.266 and Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Can-
cer Center267 as support for its finding that HIV-positive health workers posed a
256. Id.
257. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998).
258. Id. at 400.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. Mauro died prior to the Court of Appeals decision, therefore, the estate became the
party in interest for the appeal. Id. at 400 n.3. Mauro was employed by the hospital as an
operating room technician, from May of 1990 until August 24, 1992. Id. at 400. The hospital
learned of Mauro's HIV-positive status from a telephone call from an "undisclosed source" in
June of 1992. Id. The undisclosed caller told the hospital's human resource director that "Mauro
had full blown AIDS." Id.
263. Id. (citing Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1352-53 (W.D. Mich. 1995)).
The probability of an event occurring is the fourth prong of the Arline test. Id.
264. Id. (citing Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. at 1352-53). The district court also
noted that Mauro sustained these types of injuries twice during his training. Id. However, what
the district court did not consider is that Mauro was learning to be a technician during this time
and it seems reasonable that a greater number of mistakes will occur during training because
trainees are only beginning the learning process. Id. Furthermore, Mauro did not know of his
HIV status and thus was not on heightened alert and may not have followed the CDC's universal
precautions, two factors that could significantly reduce the risk of a needle prick or minor lac-
eration. Id.
265. Id. at 401 (citing Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. at 1353).
266. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
267. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
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direct threat to the health and safety of others. 26 8 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the hospital.269
The Sixth Circuit, reviewing the summary judgment de novo, acknowledged
the fact that Mauro did not have to prove that absolutely no risk existed and pur-
ported to focus on the last factor of the Arline test, the "probability," not possibil-
ity, of transmission.2 70 The circuit court examined reports from the CDC, which
recommended that most HIV-positive employees be allowed to continue with most
surgical procedures. 27 1 Like the Fourth Circuit, however, the Sixth Circuit also
relied heavily on the CDC's categorization of "exposure prone procedures. '272
Based on this CDC recommendation, a controversy ensued over how often, if ever,
Mauro put his hand inside a wound. In a deposition, he indicated that he never
personally had his hands inside a wound holding a retractor and only "'very, very
rarely"' did he have his hands near a wound. 273 The hospital indicated that, al-
though the need for a surgical technician to touch a wound was infrequent, it was
impossible to eliminate the occasional touch because emergency situations dic-
tated when a surgical technician needed to perform such a task.274
The Sixth Circuit also looked at evidence from medical experts, relying chiefly
on the deposition of Dr. Davenport who stated, "even if HIV-infected health care
workers followed universal precautions, methods designed to ensure that health
care workers do not come into contact with blood, some risk of exposure existed. 275
The circuit court apparently translated "some risk" into the required "significant
risk" for purposes of upholding the summary judgment. It also relied on other
suspect rules of probability when it recited, as evidence for the hospital, the fact
that the theoretical probability of a surgeon transmitting HIV to a patient was esti-
mated to be between 1 in 42,000 and 1 in 420,000.276 Focusing on this estimate
was inappropriate because a surgeon places her hands in a patient far more often
than a surgical technician, thus it is logical that the probability of a surgical techni-
cian transmitting HIV would be infinitesimal compared to that of a surgeon.
However, it appears that the Sixth Circuit considered the above evidence suf-
ficient to conclude that, despite the medical evidence suggesting only that some
risk was present, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Mauro
actually presented a significant risk to the health and safety of others. The circuit
court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospi-
tal. 277
The dissent argued that a genuine issue of material fact did exist and that the
precise nature of Mauro's responsibilities as a surgical technician, especially when
268. Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d at 401. The court found that these cases
were indistinguishable from the case at bar, despite the fact that Doe involved a surgeon who
likely placed his hands inside a patient's body far more often than a surgical technician. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 403. As with most HIV and direct threat cases, the parties agreed that the first
three prongs of the Arline test, the nature, duration, and severity of the risk, lean toward a direct
threat finding, thus the majority of such cases depend on a court's analysis of the fourth prong,
the probability of transmission. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 404.
274. Id. at 405.
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 407.
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read in a light most favorable to him, was certainly in dispute. 278 The dissent also
criticized the majority for equating the probability of surgical technicians trans-
mitting the disease to that of surgeons, who by "the very nature of their work enter
surgical wounds with sharp instruments during virtually every procedure they per-
form."'279 Finally, the dissent argued that summary judgment was inappropriate
because the degree of risk depends on the facts of individual cases, "not just on
aggregate data about the person's contagious disease."'280 The dissent correctly
exposed the majority's flawed reasoning and the problems that arise when a court
employs a "theoretical risk" or "any risk" standard. As a result of the court's
decision not to require detailed and objective medical evidence, Bradley was de-
nied a trial and, ultimately, his job without the court ever adequately assessing
whether a significant risk was involved. This ad hoc approach leads to unfair
prejudice because HIV-positive individuals are denied employment due to a mere
possibility of transmission.
G. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of what constitutes a direct threat in
Onishea v. Hopper.2 8 1 The case was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.282 The Alabama Department of Corrections had a policy of segregating
inmates who were HIV-positive from the general population. 283 Because they
were separated from the general population, HIV-positive inmates were not able to
participate in many programs and activities offered to inmates in the general popu-
lation.2 84 The plaintiffs claimed that denying HIV-positive prisoners activities
available to the general population, and providing other activities separate from
the general population, violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.285 In an earlier
proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court to evaluate
the risk of transmitting HIV in the individual programs that were unavailable to
HIV-positive inmates in order to determine whether the inmates were "otherwise
qualified to participate in each program. ' '286
In the second trial, each party presented considerable evidence to support their
arguments. 287 The plaintiffs maintained that the available medical evidence proved
that the chances of transmitting HIV during prison programs were "remote at
best." 288 At the time of the trial, there were no reported cases of transmitting HIV
from lesbian sex, athletic injuries, stabbings, or tattooing.2 89 The plaintiffs also
278. Id. at 408.
279. Id. at 409.
280. Id. at 411.
281. 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
282. 29 U.S.C. §§ 706-796 (2000).
283. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 E3d at 1292. Both the men's prison at Limestone Correctional
Facility and the women's prison at the Julia Tutwiler Prison for Women have special HIV-units
in which HIV-positive prisoners are housed and separated from the general population. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1293. Litigation in this case commenced over a decade ago, prior to the enactment
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, therefore, the suit was brought under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. Id. at 1292.
286. Id. at 1293.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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argued that there were "only 'sporadic' instances" of transmitting HIV from oral
sex and fistfights, and certainly not in a "commonly reoccurring way." 2 90 Al-
though the plaintiffs' medical expert "acknowledge[d] that anal sex and needle-
sharing [were] high risk activities," the plaintiffs' evidence focused on the rarity of
this type of conduct in the activities in which they wanted to participate. 2 9 1 Fur-
thermore, because the programs were in high demand, the plaintiffs argued that
inmates had every reason to "be on their best behavior," thus reducing the risk of
transmission during these activities. 292 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the high
degree of surveillance during the programs made it implausible that the dangerous
behavior would occur.293
The defendant, the correctional department, did not completely contradict the
plaintiffs' testimony.294 Instead, the correctional department introduced evidence
that transmitting HIV was "theoretically possible," despite the lack of documenta-
tion, "wherever there is a large exchange of blood between an infected person and
an uninfected [person]." '295 The defendants presented numerous incident reports
that cited instances of inmates hiding hypodermic needles, engaging in homosexual
acts, and starting fights that led to bloodshed to support their argument that there is
a high risk of transmission in prison.2 96 In addition, the defendants showed the
possibility of transmission of contagious disease by referencing a syphilis out-
break, traceable to one inmate, which spread to eighty-six inmates within the
prison.297 Finally, the defendant compared the high number of seroconversions in
fully integrated prisons to the lower seroconversions in the Alabama prison sys-
tem. 298
Although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that neither party presented iron-
clad evidence, it nevertheless utilized the cautious direct threat test.299 It based its
decision on the district court's finding that "each case of transmission, however
rare, claims at least one life," and there was a possibility that more lives could
follow if the disease was transmitted from inmate to inmate. 300 The circuit court
further reasoned that, "given this degree of harm, even slim odds of transmission
make the risk significant."'30 1
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with an exposition of the Arline test. 302
It emphasized that the word "significant" meant more than "big," stating that "we
are far more likely to consider walking a tightrope to pose a significant risk if the
rope is fifty feet high than if it is one foot off the ground ... even if the odds of
290. Id. at 1293-94.
291. Id. at 1294.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. "Seroconversion" occurs when an inmate tests negative for HIV when he or she
enters prison but later tests HIV-positive. Id. at 1294 n.5. Maryland experienced seroconversions
at an annual rate of .41%, Nevada at .19%, and Illinois at .33%. Id. Alabama, on the other hand,
had an all-time seroconversion rate of .0067%. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1295.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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losing our balance are the same however far we have to fall."'30 3 The Eleventh
Circuit followed the cautious approach taken by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits, claiming to balance two competing statutory policies. 304 The first policy
was the need to require "evidence that the asserted risk of transmission ha[d] a
sound theoretical basis" to prevent "unfounded fears."'305 The court then attempted
to balance this with the need to protect entities bound by the Act from "well-founded
worries that deaths can result from a ruling that an HIV-positive patient is other-
wise qualified" to participate in an activity. 306 The circuit court then constructed
a test in cases where the transmission of a disease inevitably leads to death. Under
this test, the evidence would be sufficient to find a significant risk if it demon-
strated that (1) "a certain event can occur" and (2) that "according to reliable medi-
cal opinion the event can transmit the disease. '307
The Eleventh Circuit further held that the district court correctly ruled that the
prison could not "reasonably accommodate" the HIV inmates because it was nei-
ther practical to classify inmates as high and low risk for the purpose of integration
nor financially feasible to hire additional guards in order to eliminate the risk of
transmission. 308 Therefore, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs' claim that rea-
sonable accommodation was possible.
The dissent exposed several flaws in the majority's reasoning. First, it argued
that the majority's blanket exclusion of HIV-positive inmates was based on the
theory that "any cognizable risk of HIV transmission, no matter how infinitesimal
and even if based on a wholly unlikely and speculative chain of event," had to be
taken into account irrespective of the possibility of reasonable accommodation.3 09
This approach fails to balance these two competing interests. 3 10
Second, the dissent pointed out'that the majority failed to recognize the Su-
preme Court's precedent concerning the "significant risk" standard. 3 11 The dis-
sent looked at the Supreme Court direct threat precedent established in Arline and
concluded that the majority improperly focused only on the third prong of the test,
the severity of risk or the "potential harm to others."'3 12 Utilizing this prong, the
majority allowed the deadly nature of the disease to "render a transmission risk
significant even if the probabilities of transmission are so low as to approach zero,
so long as transmission could theoretically occur," and this led to a requirement
that an HIV-positive individual prove that "transmission is impossible. '3 13 This
approach, according to the dissent, conflicts with Arline's instruction to consider
all four relevant factors. 3 14 The dissent also contended that the majority's ap-
proach was contrary to the Supreme Court's directives set forth in Bragdon. The
303. Id. at 1297.
304. Id. at 1298.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1299.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1303-04. In order to hire the additional guards needed for appropriate supervision,
the Correction Department would have to spend an additional twenty-three percent of its overall
budget, which the court determined was cost prohibitive. Id. at 1303.
309. Id. at 1305.
310. ld.
311. Id. at 1306-07.
312. Id. at 1306.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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"any risk" standard established by the majority resulted in a serious failure to rec-
ognize the difference between "any risk" and "significant risk" as set forth in
Bragdon.315
Third, the dissent criticized the majority's ruling because it failed to evaluate
the risk of transmission in the individual prison programs, which deprived HIV-
positive inmates without any meaningful assessment of risk.316 While the dissent
acknowledged that sex and needle sharing were conduits of HIV transmission, it
recognized that each program presented different risk levels. 3 17 In this case, there
was no separate analysis of the individual programs to determine whether or not
the plaintiffs' were "otherwise qualified" to participate in any of the programs. 3 18
Instead, the district court found that the theoretical possibility of transmission,"often based on nothing more than highly speculative scenarios, justif[ied] the
wholesale segregation and exclusion of HIV-positive inmates from prison pro-
grams and activities."'3 19 According to the dissent, this approach resulted in the
discrimination of segregated inmates based solely on their HIV status, irrespective
of the risk of transmission, and this was exactly what the "significant risk" stan-
dard was designed to prevent. 320
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's holding that the plaintiffs did
not offer reasonable accommodation alternatives. 32 1 The majority upheld the dis-
trict court's ruling that the addition of any extra officers would pose an undue
burden on the prison system because the plaintiffs did not specify which programs
they wanted integrated. 322 The dissent pointed out that this conclusion is ironic
because the district court did not conduct individual inquiries for each program to
assess the risk integration and the possibility of reasonable accommodations. 323
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Onishea direct threat test in Waddell v. Valley
Forge Dental Associates, Inc.324 Waddell was employed as a dental hygienist by
the Valley Forge Dental Associates. 325 He tested positive for the HIV virus in
1997.326 Upon learning of the results, the company placed Waddell on leave to
determine how to deal with the situation.327 The company then consulted dental
journals and contacted the CDC to help reach its conclusion that Waddell could not
continue to work as a dental hygienist because he presented a direct threat to the
health and safety of the company's patients. 328 The company offered him a cleri-
cal position, which paid about half of his dental hygienist salary.329 When Waddell
refused to accept the position, the company fired him.33 0 Waddell then filed suit
315. Id. at 1307.
316. Id. at 1305.
317. Id. at 1307.
318. Id. at 1308.
319. Id. at 1309.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1310-11.
322. Id. at 1311.
323. Id.
324. 276 F.3d 1275 (1lth Cir. 2001).
325. Id. at 1278.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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against Valley Forge, in which he sought relief under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act,
and Georgia law. 33 1 The district court granted summary judgment to Valley Forge
after finding that Waddell's position "entailed 'exposure prone' procedures," which
made him a direct threat under the Onishea standard.33 2
Despite the district court's finding that the likelihood of transmission was low,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld summary judgment because there was a possibility
that Waddell could transmit HIV to a patient because Waddell occasionally used
sharp objects while performing his job.3 33 The circuit court also found that there
was some chance of blood-to-blood contact between a patient and dental hygien-
ist, even if it was theoretical and small, and this satisfied the direct threat standard
established in Onishea.334 Like the other circuit courts using this "cautious" ap-
proach, the Eleventh Circuit made no attempt to ascertain the actual probability of
transmission. Instead, it relied on the theoretical possibility of transmission and
granted summary judgment.3 35 As a result of the diminished requirement of medi-
cal evidence, the HIV-positive individual was denied protection under the ADA
without even the benefit of a trial.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, members
had high hopes of eradicating unfair prejudice and discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities. 336 In order for individuals with HIV to be free from
these unwarranted fears and prejudice, courts must allow a moving party to invoke
the direct threat exception only if there is solid, objective medical evidence that
the HIV-positive individual poses a "significant risk" to the health and safety of
others. A mere theoretical possibility of transmission is insufficient. Both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have indicated that a more exacting standard for
determining the existence of a significant risk is necessary. Two major factors
support the belief that Congress intended that the direct threat exception be in-
voked only when the moving party presented exacting, objective medical evidence
to prove the existence of a direct threat.
First, Congress explicitly codified 337 the direct threat standard set forth in
School Board v. Arline.33 8 The Arline test requires that courts look at more than
the severity of the harm; it also requires that the courts examine the probability, not
possibility, of transmitting the disease. 339 The codification of a standard that re-
quires courts to assess the probability, rather than the mere possibility, of transmis-
sion suggests that Congress intended that a more rigorous standard be met in order
to invoke the direct threat exception.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1278-79.
333. Id. at 1282-83.
334. Id. at 1283.
335. Id.
336. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 22-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 303-
04.
337. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359.
338. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
339. Id. at 288.
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Second, the definition of direct threat provides evidence that Congress in-
tended more than an "any risk" standard. According to Congress, a direct threat is"a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary
aids or services." 340 In choosing to define direct threat by using the word "signifi-
cant," in lieu of words such as any, small, or infinitesimal, Congress established its
position that, in order to protect individuals from unfair discrimination, the direct
threat exception should not be used just because "any risk" exists. Therefore,
courts should respect Congress's desire to protect individuals with disabilities and
invoke the direct threat exception only if the moving party presents a high level of
evidence that establishes that an HIV-positive individual poses a "significant," not
just "any," risk to the health and safety of others.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated what constitutes a direct
threat, the Court has conveyed directives for lower courts to follow. First, the
Arline case suggests that the Supreme Court conceived of invoking the direct threat
exception only if the moving party presented a high level of objective medical
evidence. The Supreme Court held that an individual with tuberculosis was "handi-
capped" under the Rehabilitation Act but remanded the case so that the lower court
could thoroughly examine the objective medical evidence presented in order to
determine whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach. 34 1 The decision to
remand the "otherwise qualified" component of the case provides evidence that
the Supreme Court conceived of implementing a standard based on a high level of
objective medical evidence. 34 2
The Supreme Court's discussion of the direct threat exception in Bragdon
provides strong evidence that the Court envisioned that the direct threat exception
be invoked only when the moving party presented comprehensive, objective medi-
cal evidence. 34 3 First, the Court expressly recognized that the "any risk" standard
is inappropriate "[b]ecause few, if any, activities in life are risk free, and the ADA
does not ask whether a risk exists, but whether it is significant. ' 344 When the
Court examined the evidence presented in the case, it signaled that an intense ex-
amination of the facts, accompanied by specific, objective medical evidence, was
necessary. The Court reviewed the medical evidence presented during discovery
and it emphasized the importance of the credibility of the public health authorities,
such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institute of Health,
which provided comprehensive and objective medical evidence. 34 5 The Court
340. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2000).
341. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
342. It appears that the lower court also recognized the Supreme Court's intent to require a
high level of objective medical evidence in order for the school board to prove that Arline was
not "otherwise qualified" to teach. On remand, the lower court discussed, in great detail, the
importance of the findings of facts, the breadth of the medical evidence, and the low probability
of transmitting tuberculosis through the air. Arline v. Sch. Bd., 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1287-91
(N.D. Fla. 1988). The lower court also examined the nature, duration, and severity of the risk
involved and the probability of transmission of tuberculosis, and held that Arline was qualified
to teach elementary school. Id. at 1291-92.
343. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
344. Id. at 648 (citing Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)).
345. Id. (citing Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c), pt. 36, App. B, p.
626 (1997)).
[Vol. 55:2
HIV AND THE ADA: WHAT IS A DIRECT THREAT?
also recognized that Bragdon's evidence was based on speculation and inconclu-
sive data, which was problematic because "[s]cientific evidence and expert testi-
mony must have a traceable, analytical basis in objective fact before it may be
considered on summary judgment. '346 The Court's intense scrutiny of the evi-
dence, its statement that Bragdon's evidence was speculation, and its decision to
remand suggest that the Court intended that a high level of medical evidence be
presented when a direct threat exception is asserted.
Unfortunately, the majority of circuit courts have missed the signals sent by
the Supreme Court and have ignored the intent of Congress to require a high level
of objective medical evidence for the invocation of the direct threat exception.
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits not only require little evidence to
prove that an HIV-positive individual poses a direct threat to the health and safety
of others, but also have granted summary judgment to the moving parties, thereby
denying the disabled individual an opportunity for trial. 347 After examining the
legislative history and Supreme Court precedents, it seems clear that the ADA
cannot meet its vision of protecting disabled Americans from unfair discrimina-
tion if circuit courts continue to perpetuate unfounded prejudice with a loose direct
threat standard. Most circuits have misconstrued the direct threat issue and, argu-
ably, the better approach in the First and Ninth Circuits means that this issue is ripe
for the Supreme Court to resolve the split.
Dawn-Marie Harmon
346. Id. at 653 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997)).
347. E.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assoc., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001);
Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Univ. of Md.
Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995); Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1993).
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